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Abstract 
 
 
JOHN REMENSPERGER: New Media and Political Threats: Standing with Planned 
Parenthood 
(Under the direction of Dr. Daren C. Brabham) 
 
 
 Much of the scholarship on the media strategies of social movement organizations 
(SMOs) has focused on how these organizations frame issues. More recently, scholars have 
written about the strategies of digitally native, online advocacy organizations like 
MoveOn.org. There is a lack of research, however, on how long-standing organizations adapt 
to new media environments in response to political threats. Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America’s implementation of tactics like the “Planned Parenthood Truth Tour” and other 
strategies suggest that older SMOs are attempting, via new media, to take advantage of 
enthusiasm and interest from publics as they arise. This thesis reveals ways in which existing 
SMOs prep for and subsequently leverage moments of political contention. It also shows how 
a long-standing organization that advocates for abortion rights utilizes new media in its 
political strategy, thus extending previous literature on abortion politics and providing 
normative guidelines for practitioners involved in similar contentious moments. 
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Introduction 
On March 7, 2011, Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) posted to 
Facebook and Twitter a photo of a shiny, large, hot-pink chartered bus with the words “I 
Stand With Planned Parenthood” written on its side in large white letters (Planned 
Parenthood, 2011a).  Also on the side of the bus, in the same huge white letters, statistics 
such as “4,000,000 STD tests” and “1,800,000 Cancer Screenings” were displayed. The 
caption of the photo said, “We got a pretty loud bus so that the truth about Planned 
Parenthood could be heard wherever we go!” The photo also was accompanied by a 
hyperlink forwarding users to a brand-new website entitled the “Planned Parenthood Truth 
Tour,” which included a blog detailing the bus’ upcoming destinations, fundraising appeals, 
and a link to another site, raiseyourhand.org, which aggregated photos of users physically 
raising their hands in support of PPFA (Planned Parenthood, n.d.-a). In the weeks that 
followed, PPFA used the bus as the centerpiece of events in many different cities, 
highlighting each event on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Articles about the bus tour were 
featured on liberal and conservative blogs such as The DailyKos (e.g. Eclectablog, 2011) and 
LifeSiteNews (e.g. Jalsevac, 2011), respectively. The tour also received coverage by local 
and national television and radio outlets. According to one of PPFA’s social media 
strategists, the truth tour allowed staff to “proactively meet with people who were using our 
services or benefiting from our services or definitely had a stake in the game . . . . and 
[record] it for what we were doing online” (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 
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2013). This included “tweets and updates and things like that for people who weren’t with us 
to . . . follow along and track the process.”  
The “Planned Parenthood Truth Tour” was not a standalone publicity event, but 
rather part of a larger, three-month-long, coordinated campaign to quash an effort by 
Republicans in the United States Congress to eliminate millions of dollars in federal “Title 
X” funds that PPFA had been receiving annually to provide family planning services since 
the 1970s (Aries, 1987). PPFA’s effort included a variety of tactics, ranging from traditional 
lobbying of politicians to the aggregation and dissemination of user-generated online content 
that showcased public support for PPFA.  
PPFA’s integration and use of social media to connect online supporters to live events 
shows how the organization was attempting to reach its audience in ways that traditional 
media—radio, television, and newspapers—do not provide. This campaign reveals the way in 
which a long-standing organization was using new media to mobilize supporters, influence 
politicians, and garner attention in a media environment that includes both traditional media 
as well as blogs and social media sites like Facebook and Twitter.  
This thesis offers an inquiry into how long-established social movement organizations 
(SMOs) – such as PPFA – adapt to new media environments, specifically when faced with 
political threats. This research shows how these organizations internally prepare social media 
tactics and how they implement these tactics in response to political threats. This research 
also shows how responding to such threats can affect an organization’s capacity to engage in 
future conflicts. This research highlights the interaction within large organizations between 
traditional and digital communication teams. Finally, this thesis focuses on how 
organizations are leveraging online supporters to increase their media exposure.  
  9 
Much of the scholarship on the media strategies of SMOs has focused on how these 
organizations frame issues (Burns, 2005; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; 
Rohlinger, 2002, 2006). More recently, scholars have written about the strategies of digitally 
native, online advocacy organizations like MoveOn.org (Carty, 2011; Karpf, 2012). There is 
a lack of research, however, on how long-standing organizations adapt to new media 
environments, specifically in response to political threats. Karpf (2012) explains how single-
issue legacy organizations rely on “armchair activists” (p.37) whose only interaction with the 
organization is the process of making annual donations. By contrast, internet-mediated 
political organizations such as Moveon.org engage regularly with supporters to request small 
donations or specific actions based on the day-to-day happenings in the political 
environment. PPFA’s implementation of tactics like the “Planned Parenthood Truth Tour” 
and other cross-media strategies suggest that older SMOs are attempting, via new media, to 
take advantage of enthusiasm and interest from publics as they arise.  
 This thesis proceeds in four parts. First, it examines the literature on social movement 
organizations, abortion politics, and the use of new media to influence the political system. It 
then discusses the methods for this case study, which include in-depth interviews with PPFA 
staff and the examination of press releases and social media data. To conclude, it discusses 
the implications of these findings for scholarly understandings of SMOs and their 
relationship to media environments.  
 
 Literature Review 
 
The study of new media and political processes is relatively new in comparison to the 
broad disciplines of political sociology, political communication, and political science with 
which it is often placed. Early scholarly discussions in this area focused on the potential for 
new media to disrupt long-standing political processes and institutionalized bureaucracy (cf. 
Tambini, 1999; Witschge, 2004). Many of them postulated that technological determinism 
and new media would flatten organizational structures and usher in a new era of deliberative 
democracy. Scholars continue to debate the validity of these claims (cf. Dahlberg, 2007). 
This review omits these discussions of new media’s potential and focuses on empirical 
studies of new media practices and their relationship to political interest groups and social 
movements. It also provides an overview of relevant literature about advocacy organizations, 
abortion politics, and online public relations.  
 
Social Movement Organizations and Political Information Cycles 
 
Scholars have discussed at length the relationship between political opportunities and 
threats and the actions of social movements organizations (SMOs) (McAdam & Tarrow, 
2011; McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). Included in these actions are the choices made by SMOs 
in the media arena (Rohlinger, 2006). One of the most prolific topics explored by scholars 
interested in the media strategies of SMOs is framing, or the act of presenting an issue in a 
particular way to encourage a particular interpretation (Burns, 2005; Ferree et al., 2002; 
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Rohlinger, 2002, 2006). However, some scholars have criticized this focus on framing as 
insufficient in explaining movement success. Ryan & Gamson (2006), argued that framing, 
while integral to movement strategy, is only effective in the context of movement building 
strategies such as “acquiring resources, developing infrastructure and leadership, analyzing 
power relations, and planning strategy” (p. 13). Scholars have shown how an organization 
can gain access to media over time, by establishing itself as an expert on a particular issue 
(Ryan, Anastario, & Jeffreys, 2005) or it can insert itself (or be inserted into) the media 
environment based on an issue related to the organization’s goals, assuming that issue is 
deemed to be newsworthy by the media (Ryan, 1991). Recent scholarship on contentious 
events, however, has shown that a “hybrid media system” (p. 5), created by interplay 
between the norms of online media and those of traditional journalistic organizations, has 
opened up opportunities for other actors, including activists, to gain access to and influence 
media (Chadwick, 2011a).  
According to Chadwick (2011b), the production of news, prior to the popularity of 
new media, used to be almost completely based on interaction between media and political 
elites. While these actors continue to hold powerful positions in the media environment, the 
interplay between bloggers, citizen activists, politicians, and other actors has created 
“complex assemblages” (p. 11) in which these diverse actors exchange information and 
interact with one another. He explains how the integration of Facebook and Twitter into the 
practice of journalism allows outsiders greater influence on the media by activists who utilize 
those social media platforms. Chadwick refers to these multi-actor environments as “political 
information cycles” (p. 11). Anderson (2010) saw similar complexities in a study of local 
news diffusion, in which activists repeatedly were able to influence media coverage of a 
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contentious event in order to achieve their political goals. In each of these cases, actors were 
able to extend the life of these news events to advance particular causes. While both 
Chadwick (2011a) and Anderson (2010) have discussed the role of activists and other actors 
in influencing news production around contentious events, there has been minimal 
scholarship exploring the role of formal SMOs in such episodes. 
  
New Media and Mobilization 
 
 Several scholars have discussed ways in which activists have harnessed new media to 
increase participation in movement activities. These writings have focused primarily on 
large-scale protest events or on digital activism taking place in new media environments. 
Much of the research in this area has discussed the “Battle of Seattle,” in which activists in a 
global justice movement used new media to organize massive protests at the annual World 
Trade Organization meeting in 1999 (Bennett, 2003; Bimber, 2003; Kahn & Kellner, 2004; 
L. Lievrouw, 2011). Scholars discussed the movement’s mobilization tactics, which included 
the use of emails and websites to coordinate simultaneous demonstrations, as well as well as 
ways in which movements used new media to influence traditional media. Recently, scholars 
interested in technology and social protest have focused their studies on the “Arab Spring,” 
in which citizens engaged in collective action used social media technology as part of their 
mobilization tactics against repressive governments in the Middle East (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2011).  
 Lievrouw (2011) focuses much more on the use of new media by individual activists 
than by formal groups (though she also discussed the Battle of Seattle). Lievrouw explains 
how new media allows activists to engage in “culture jamming,” (p. 72) in which popular 
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culture images or video are repurposed for societal critique. In the context of political 
organization and social movements, Lievrouw also discusses “mediated mobilization,” (p. 
25) in which individuals use technologies like social networking sites and email listservs to 
build and maintain online networks based on shared goals and values, eventually mobilizing 
these networks to enact the desired social change.  
Scholars interested in studying the use of new media by social movement 
organizations have focused on the emergence of “multi-issue, Internet-mediated 
organizations” (Carty, 2011) that use digital media to mobilize supporters around multiple 
issues over long periods of time with a small staff and low overhead. Karpf (2012) argued 
that new media have allowed movement organizations to operate with such limited staff and 
overhead, reducing the costs of collective action and resulting in new types of political 
expression. In terms of mobilization tactics, Carty (2011) highlighted MoveOn’s successful 
online fundraising appeals, two-way communication with members via online forums, and 
increasing awareness of public issues as emblematic of this new type of organization. While 
these studies provide insight into new types of advocacy organizations that have emerged in 
recent decades, they do not focus on long-standing advocacy organizations that combine 
traditional and new media advocacy tactics in order to shape public opinion and influence 
public policy outcomes.  
Further, though Kreiss has written in detail about the implementation of new media 
strategies by presidential campaigns and political parties (2012a), and the interplay between 
campaigns and activist media (2012b), there is a gap in scholarly literature about new media 
use by what Karpf (2010) refers to as "legacy organizations," those political organizations 
that pre-date the Internet and historically have relied on more formal institutions for 
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mobilization and fundraising purposes. Recently, Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl (2012) 
narrowed this gap in a study of three organizations: The American Legion, the American 
Association of Retired People (AARP) and MoveOn. Indeed their work does provide an 
examination into the digital media strategies of two long-standing organizations: The 
American Legion and AARP. However, neither organization is particularly contentious nor is 
either closely affiliated with a particular social movement (though one might argue that 
AARP is aligned with the movement for socialized medicine and welfare due to its support 
for Medicare and Social Security). Using a broad definition of collective action—
“associating voluntarily with others who share interests or identities, and it can mean 
participating in solving problems at the local, national, or global scale” (p. 20)—Bimber et al. 
(2012) challenge the idea that traditional, membership-based civic institutions, such as 
AARP and the American Legion, are failing or being replaced by Internet-mediated groups 
such as those discussed above. Within the extant literature there remains a gap in scholarship 
around the use of new media technology by long-standing social movement organizations.  
 
 
Technology Enactment 
 
 
The recent works by Karpf (2012) and Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2012) discussed 
above do mention briefly how organizations learn to use new technology in long-standing 
organizations. Organization learning surrounding the implementation of new technologies 
has also been examined with a systems perspective (e.g. Norris & Thompson, 1991). Some 
scholars argue that the study of failures and successes of public sector entities is grounded in 
early theories of organizational development such as those theories of organizational 
environments and the interdependence of actors within an organization (Emery & Trist, 
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1965). Kraemer & King (1986) found that the implementation of information systems in was 
often “mediated by organizational concerns for maintaining control and stability”. In his 
1995 book, Computer Technologies and Social Issues, (Garson, 1995) discussed how 
organizational elements and human factors, such as conflicting priorities between employees 
focused on minimizing costs and those focused on maximizing service, could potentially 
affect the implementation of information systems.  
Fountain (2001) identified specific issues with organizational enactment of 
technology. She wrote that as a technology goes from objective to enacted, it passes through 
two organizational filters: organizational form, including hierarchy, accountability, rules, 
existing processes, behavior patterns and norms, and institutional arrangements including 
organizational culture, formal rules, and social patterns. These filters affect the design, 
development, implementation, and most importantly, the use of the technology. Regarding 
the use, she suggested that organizations tend to “implement new information technology in 
ways that reproduce, indeed strengthen, institutionalized socio-structural mechanisms even 
when such enactments lead to seeming irrational and ostensibly sub-optimal use of 
technology” (p. 57).  
Abortion Politics 
 
Finally, scholars have also discussed media tactics in the specific context of the 
abortion rights movement. Luker (1984) discussed the use of “stars” (p.62)—people whose 
social characteristics provide value, including legitimacy, to a movement by affiliating with 
it. For abortion rights groups this included jurists and famous physicians. She also explained 
how, in the 1960s, the Society for Humane Abortions attempted to increase support for 
abortion reform by broadcasting their message directly using late-night radio and television 
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spots and lectures. Staggenborg (1991) explained how affiliation with particular persons or 
groups, such as the Clergy Consultation Services—a group of rabbis and clergy members 
who supported repeal of abortion laws—provided legitimization to the abortion rights 
movement in the late 1960s. She also noted how the abortion rights movement capitalized on 
media coverage of crises that inherently changed the discourse over abortion to one focused 
more narrowly on women’s health. These crises included a rash of birth deformities caused 
by the medication thalidomide and an outbreak of rubella, in garnering public support for 
their cause.  
As mentioned above, most scholarly discussions of strategy by SMOs in the pro-
choice movement have focused on framing. This is also true among scholarly works on 
abortion politics. According to Burns (2005), the abortion rights movement is extremely 
effective at maintaining its favorable status quo because it frames its causes with a “moral 
worldview,” (p. 16) an uncompromising perspective based on a particular value or ideal. He 
explains how this frame, rooted in feminism, is effective in mobilizing support because it 
links abortion restrictions to things many people find difficult to support, such as exertion of 
outside control over a woman’s body or misogyny. Rohlinger (2002, 2006) examined how 
movement organizations modified their frames for particular political environments and how 
these environments affected the way in which they interacted with allied organizations. To 
date, scholars who study the pro-choice movement have not looked at how related SMOs use 
new media to achieve policy goals or to influence public opinion. This thesis will contribute 
to scholarly knowledge of SMOs by revealing ways in which they use new media to prep for 
and subsequently leverage moments of political contention. It shows how, through an 
iterative process spanning multiple events, an organization enacted new technologies to 
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support its mission and mobilize supporters. It reveals the importance of these moments to an 
organization’s public image and to its long-term sustainability. It also shows how a long-
standing advocate for abortion rights utilizes new media in its political strategy, extending 
previous literature on abortion politics and providing normative guidelines for practitioners 
involved in similar contentious moments.  
 
 Methods 
 
To explore in-depth a long-standing SMO adapting to a new media environment, I 
compiled multiple sources of evidence to create a case study. Social movement research 
regularly has utilized case studies when the objects of study are individual movements and 
movement organizations (Lofland, 1996; Snow & Trom, 2002). The case study method also 
is regularly employed by scholars of public relations to explore the motivations of 
organizations engaging in public relations strategies (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). Case studies 
offer the opportunity to explore social phenomenon in rich detail through the “use and 
triangulation of multiple methods” (Snow & Trom, 2002). The object of analysis for the case 
study is Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA), starting with its campaign to 
protect its federal funding in 2011, discussed above, through the end of the conflict over its 
exclusion from the Susan G. Komen Foundation’s grant program in 2012. One might argue 
that these two events should constitute two separate cases. This argument ignores the aspects 
of organizational learning and adaptation that can be garnered from investigating an 
organization’s tactics in two separate events, given that very little time passed between the 
two events. Also, scholars regularly have utilized broad boundaries in determining objects of 
case studies, so long as the study is indeed bounded in a particular time and space (Feagin, 
Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991; Ragin & Becker, 1992).  
The data for this case study come from five sources: (1) in-depth interviews with two 
key members of PPFA’s communication team during the period in early 2011 when the 
organization was in danger of losing federal funding through the period in 2012 when the 
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Komen Foundation was threatening to deny PPFA participation in its grant program; (2) a 
one-hour panel discussion between five members of PPFA’s staff from the South by 
Southwest (SXSW) 2012 Digital Media conference; (3) print media articles from these same 
time periods; (4) press releases from PPFA and from its political arm, Planned Parenthood 
Action Fund; (5) posts from PPFA’s Facebook fan page.   
In February of 2012, two open-ended, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with two of PPFA’s communications staff members. During the time periods focused on in 
this study, one subject, Angela Martin, held a director-level position working in traditional 
communication and the other, Mary Stevens, worked on development and implementation of 
PPFA’s social media strategy. Participants in this study were promised confidentiality. As 
such, the names mentioned above and throughout the paper are pseudonyms. In addition to 
their statements lacking identifiable attribution, they also could ask that statements be “off 
the record.” This distinction allowed them to provide me with context for their statements 
while also maintaining their confidentiality in regard to comments that would personally 
identify them as interview subjects. The Institutional Review Board of the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill granted this proposal expedited review and approved the study 
along with consent forms for both in-person interviews and those conducted via video chat 
services.  
The SXSW panel, entitled “Stand With Planned Parenthood: A Crisis Response,” and 
featuring five integral members of PPFA’s digital media team, was focused primarily on the 
organization’s use of social media during 2011, though it also included discussion of the 
Komen controversy. The panel discussion was acquired in digital audio format from the 
SXSW 2012 website. When possible, individual statements made in these interviews were 
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corroborated by interview participants or by secondary sources such as the media described 
above.  
In order to map the contours of this case, I did a Google Trends search to find out 
when this issue was salient in the public’s mind (see Figure 1). Google Trends provides data 
on how often a search term is entered relative to Google’s total search volume. For the 
purposes of this study, I searched for instances of “Planned Parenthood” between July 2010 
and December 2012. This provided me with two specific periods during which the public had 
increased interest in PPFA: December 19, 2010 through May 7, 2011, and January 28, 2012 
through February 18th, 2012. To provide context for the organization’s media activity outside 
of these moments of contention, I broadened these periods to: (1) November 2, 2010 the day 
of the midterm elections, when the Republican Party took control of Congress, through April 
30, 2011, twenty-two days after the proposed budget that would have cut Title X funds failed 
to pass the Senate; (b) January 31, 2012, the day that the Komen controversy broke in the 
popular press, through March 1, 2012, twenty-five days after Komen foundation altered its 
new grant requirements to include PPFA. The remaining data sources—newspaper articles, 
press releases, and Facebook posts—were collected over these two time periods.  
The newspaper articles, collected via the LexisNexis database of major world 
publications, included 488 articles. The census of PPFA’s press releases, obtained from 
Planned Parenthood’s websites, included 108 individual releases. Via the PPFA Facebook 
Fan Page, 560 individual posts were collected and analyzed (see figure 2 for a breakdown of 
these publicity sources by date and source type). Documents were read several times and 
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Figure 1. Google Trends output for Planned Parenthood, 2011-2012 
 
marginal notes were made on common language, themes, and messaging to track patterns 
and assure a thorough understanding of the order of events and intended message of each 
item. 
In some cases, interviews and Facebook posts provided links to additional PPFA web 
properties, such as event-specific blogs, microsites, and social media sites, which were 
incorporated into the study and subsequently analyzed. 
 
 Period 1 November 2, 2010 –  
April 30, 2011 
Period 2 
January 31, 2012 – 
 March 30, 2012.  
News Articles 338 150 
Press Releases 69 PPFA 15 PPAF (Action Fund)  
17 PPFA  
7 PPAF (Action Fund) 
Facebook Posts 387 173 
 
Figure 2. Breakdown of materials for qualitative analysis 
 Case Analysis 
 
This section, presented in chronological order and with corresponding themes, 
outlines PPFA’s actions during three specific periods. The first part focuses on PPFA’s 
development of new media strategies in the absence of a specific political crisis. The second 
part focuses on its application and evaluation of these strategies in a political conflict over its 
access to government funds. The third part focuses on PPFA’s strategies during a conflict 
with another organization, with a specific focus on changes made to these strategies based on 
the previous crisis. Each part shows both the growth of the organization’s new media 
strategies and its allocation of resources for new media activities.  
 
Capacity Building 
 
In July of 2009, as Congress and President Obama were working to craft what would 
eventually become the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Republican 
minority in Congress was attempting to include in the legislation a provision that would 
exclude reproductive health care (including birth control and contraception services) from the 
services available under government-approved healthcare plans. The Republicans were also 
suggesting the PPFA should be excluded from the “health exchanges,” the government-
sponsored marketplaces from which citizens would select local healthcare providers under 
the proposed law. PPFA staff members responded to these threats by posting to their 
Facebook page a 366-word note entitled, “Take action to protect reproductive health care,” 
which explained the organization’s opposition to the Republican provisions (Planned 
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Parenthood, 2009a). PPFA also linked to several documents, including a press release on its 
website, instructions for contacting U.S. senators, and a petition opposing the potential 
provisions. PPFA also authored identical posts on left-leaning blogs like The Daily Kos 
(Planned Parenthood, 2009b) and Feministing (Planned Parenthood, 2009c). These identical 
posts are representative of PPFA’s strategies for social media sites like Facebook and Twitter 
at that time. PPFA’s staff saw those social networking sites as vehicles for driving users to 
the organization’s website and for disseminating more crafted, formal press releases (M. 
Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013).  
In November 2009, the United States House of Representatives passed the Stupak-
Pitts Amendment, which aimed to exclude those private healthcare plans that provided 
abortion coverage from the insurance exchanges being proposed in the ACA (Friedman, 
2009). In a press release, PPFA argued that the amendment would “undermin[e] the ability of 
women to purchase private health plans that cover abortion care, even if they pa[id] for most 
of the premium with their own money” (Planned Parenthood, 2009d). In the weeks and 
months that followed, PPFA was an extremely audible voice in opposition to such 
amendments and ultimately supported the passage of the final version of the ACA, which 
included coverage for reproductive health services (Protection & Affordable Care Act, 2010). 
As PPFA worked to mobilize its supporters toward these ends, staff working on new media 
for PPFA argued that the organization’s Facebook page had more potential for interacting 
with supporters than it was being utilized for (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 
14, 2013). Stevens remarked: 
While some people thought our Facebook page exist[ed] so we [could] drive traffic 
back to our website, I thought the Facebook page existed for the sake of the Facebook 
page—like for the sake of the community in it of itself—and that if people had a good 
experience there then they would turn to [a PPFA] mobile health center for help or 
  24 
then they would care about what happened to us in the event of something going 
down with their local or federal [health] policy.  
 
She noted that many members of PPFA’s management saw social media, and Facebook in 
particular, as “something that kids do . . . that can’t make a change or impact.”  
Staff members at PPFA’s direct response team used email to disseminate messages, 
encourage supporters to contact legislators, and to fundraise (A. Martin, personal 
communication, February 21, 2013). Though they used email for annual fundraising drives in 
ways similar to those employed by the “legacy organizations” depicted by Karpf (2012, p. 
14), PPFA also had adopted the event-driven tactics of newer organizations like MoveOn.org 
(Carty, 2011 and Karpf, 2012). Using separate email lists that could be activated depending 
on the desired outcome (e.g. fundraising vs. outreach to legislators), PPFA sent emails 
mobilizing supporters against the Stupak-Pitts amendment and in support of the ACA. In 
these efforts, the direct response team relied on sophisticated analytical tools to determine 
which email subject lines resulted in the most emails opened and which messages resulted in 
the most dollars given. The direct response team also worked with PPFA’s 80 nationwide 
affiliates (e.g. Planned Parenthood of Central North Carolina) to share email lists, coordinate 
fundraising campaigns and disseminate information. When PPFA first began to implement 
social media programs, it originally saw social media as an extension of this email-based 
fundraising program (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). The new media 
team setup a Facebook “cause,” a type of page template built specifically around charitable 
giving, and posted messages asking Facebook users to participate in PPFA’s annual giving 
campaigns on Mother’s Day and at the end of the year. The new media team pushed back 
against the use of social media for these purposes, with one staff member arguing that it “put 
people off to constantly fundraise on social [media]” (M. Stevens, personal communication, 
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March 14, 2013). Between these arguments, and research showing that social media was 
ineffective at driving up significant gifts, PPFA moved away from using its social media 
properties for regular fundraising and used it to focus on community building and 
information dissemination.  
Despite some internal skepticism and a lack of resources devoted specifically to 
social media, the digital media team took advantage of the controversy over the Stupak-Pitts 
amendment and the ACA to further develop the organization’s presence on Facebook and 
Twitter (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). The digital team staff 
developed “The Pit,” a collaborative, open, corral-like area of the main PPFA office. This 
setup allowed those involved in social media to brainstorm content for the social media 
properties without impacting traditional staffers by yelling ideas across the office. The team 
also worked to create a social media persona on PPFA’s social media accounts that, as one 
social media strategist described, could “take these complex…political decisions or moves 
that were happening in D.C. and make them so that they were palatable and understandable 
for [a] social audience and then give them an action” (Bryant, Lazzaro, Holdridge, Hansen, & 
Lauf, 2012). In the case of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, the team had to be clear that they 
supported the overall idea of healthcare reform but were dissatisfied with the current iteration 
of the bill. The team posted bright pink graphics that said, “Wanted: Access to Health Care” 
or “Pass Health Care Reform” juxtaposed next to “Stop the Abortion Coverage Ban” to 
highlight this dichotomy. PPFA also began to use Facebook to invite users to submit 
testimonials about their positive, and in some cases, life-saving experiences receiving 
medical care from PPFA and other reproductive health providers. Staff members also sent 
tweets from PPFA President Cecile Richards’ Twitter account, which at the time was 
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completely managed by the digital team (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 
2013). Though PPFA staff had installed a Twitter application on Richards’ mobile phone and 
encouraged her to send tweets herself, she had not made it a priority to do so herself.   
While the digital team worked to add more content to PPFA’s social media 
properties, it still found itself struggling to prove the value of social media to the 
organization’s upper management (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). 
Digital team members worked to educate management about the value of social media in 
general by gathering and sharing articles and testimonials from other organizations that had 
more fully committed to the technology. Despite this, the team struggled to garner additional 
resources from PPFA’s management. It was clear that in order to prove the value of social 
media to the organization, the team had to put more work into developing content and 
interacting with users online. Yet, doing so required additional staff members that would 
only be provided once management had been convinced of the value of social media to the 
organization. The team got around this issue by hiring two temporary interns. The interns did 
not represent to management the cost and commitment that full time employees did. Also, 
due to their age, the interns were predisposed to a level of familiarity with Facebook and 
Twitter (see Palfrey & Gasser, 2008 for a discussion of digital natives). The digital team also 
found internal allies in Planned Parenthood Online (PPO), the division of PPFA responsible 
for developing and maintaining the technical aspects of the organization’s web presence. 
PPO provided the digital team with technical support, such as updated graphics, allowing 
them to create more attractive Facebook and Twitter pages.  
To some degree, the social media team did use analytics to track and justify their 
social media use, but they approached these reports with a certain amount of skepticism (M. 
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Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). For example, Stevens noted that simply 
relying on high numbers of retweets, the online messages reposted on Twitter by third 
parties, provided only a partial view of online activity. She said, “sometimes we would have 
100 retweets but they were retweets by (PPFA’s opponents).” The social media team came to 
rely more on soft metrics, including public online conversations that ended well, participation 
in online communities, and connections with allies from other organizations. By the time the 
ACA passed, the amount of activity taking place on PPFA’s social media properties had 
grown to a level where organizational leaders were starting to recognize these media as 
effective in facilitating engagement with supporters.  
PPFA’s attempts to develop relationships with online communities were not limited 
to its burgeoning efforts on social media. Beginning in 2008, PPFA decided to focus 
specifically on building relationships with one of the ethnic communities that made up the 
majority of their health clinic users, Latinos (Planned Parenthood, 2009e). The 
communications team expanded to include a new full-time position dedicated to this 
community and launched their first Latino Outreach Initiative, aimed at increasing awareness 
among Latinos about reproductive health risks and the PPFA brand (A. Martin, personal 
communication, February 21, 2013). In its early stages, this initiative targeted Latinos 
primarily via print media and traditional practices of relationship building. PPFA staff built 
relationships with editors and reporters, helping to place stories and editorial pieces about 
reproductive health in prominent Spanish language newspapers, including El Diario, La 
Opinión, and El Sentinel. They also worked on community health projects aimed specifically 
at Latinos, including a Spanish-language version of PPFA’s “Get Yourself Tested” program, 
and sponsored National Latino Aids Awareness Day. Eventually, this outreach expanded into 
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online spaces, culminating in a Spanish-language version of the Planned Parenthood website. 
PPFA employed digital outreach specialists to blog about reproductive health from a Latino 
perspective in online spaces, such as Being Latino, where Latinos regularly discussed cultural 
and entertainment issues (Bryant et al., 2012). PPFA connected with users on this site by 
contributing articles like, “OMG, My Girlfriend is Pregnant” (Lazzaro, 2011a) and “Ricky 
Martin: Being Latino and Gay (Lazzaro, 2010). In 2010, when immigration rights played a 
major role in several elections in the southwestern United States, PPFA supported (both 
online and in person) immigration reform, developing allied communities in the process.  
In 2010, PPFA expanded this outreach to African Americans. PPFA hired a Director 
of African-American Media who originally was brought on to build relationships specifically 
with traditional urban, black media, including radio, magazines, and local newspapers (M. 
Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). Quickly, however, PPFA realized that 
African-American communities were extremely active in digital spaces. Staff compiled a list 
of bloggers who were well connected within the black community, writing for online 
magazines such as The Root, Parlour Magazine, and Clutch Magazine. For these writers, 
PPFA staff hosted “blogger brunches” at the PPFA offices in New York City. During these 
meetings, bloggers would listen to PPFA President Cecile Richards, healthcare providers, 
and PPFA staff members speaking about women’s health issues, particularly those relevant 
to the black community. PPFA staff members made it clear to these writers that they would 
make themselves available to them if a story arose for their publications and conversely, the 
bloggers let PPFA staff know the specific issues that their readers were interested in. These 
meetings also created a direct line for PPFA to notify the black community about specific 
legislation that might influence their readers.  
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Though PPFA’s staff members did not know it at the time, their work building 
relationships and maintaining ties with online communities, combined with the tactics 
developed throughout the fight over the ACA, particularly those related to social media, 
would play an instrumental role in the organization’s battle to retain federal Title X funds in 
2011.  
 
Response to a Threat 
 
This section explains how PPFA staff members applied, in response to a threat, the 
new media tactics they had been developing over the previous two years. They also worked 
to leverage the relationships they had been building with PPFA’s partner organizations, 
social media followers, and with African-American and Latino online communities. This 
allowed the organization to capitalize on the threat by increasing fundraising and 
mobilization efforts via email and social media.  
On January 24, 2011 PPFA issued a press release stating that it had notified the 
United States Department of Justice about repeated visits by potential sex traffickers to PPFA 
clinics in six states (Planned Parenthood, 2011b). In the press release, PPFA pre-emptively 
identified Live Action, an anti-abortion group with a history of making videos that cast PPFA 
in a bad light, as involved with setting up these visits. PPFA chastised them for “falsely 
claiming sex trafficking to health professionals to advance a political agenda” (Planned 
Parenthood, 2011b). PPFA also posted a link to this press release on Facebook and Twitter 
(Planned Parenthood, 2011c). Over the next two weeks, Live Action released several videos 
that portrayed PPFA clinicians as willingly providing controversial and potentially illegal 
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advice to undercover actors portraying a pimp and an underage prostitute (e.g. Schmidt, 
2011).  
Republicans in Congress, led by Representative Mike Pence of Indiana, used these 
videos to attack PPFA’s reputation as a health organization and to buttress a burgeoning 
campaign among Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives to eliminate federal Title 
X funds, a move that would effectively deny PPFA and other health providers from receiving 
federal funds to support family planning services (Eldridge, 2011). PPFA had been receiving 
these funds since the passage of the Public Health Service Act in 1970 (Aries, 1987).  
On February 18, the House voted (240-185) to eliminate Title X funds, advancing the 
issue to the U.S. Senate and moving the federal government one step closer to effectively 
defunding PPFA (Mascaro & Hennessey, 2011). When the House vote finally happened, it 
was not a surprise to PPFA’s communications strategists (Bryant et al., 2012). Within 
minutes of the congressional vote, PPFA released a statement by PPFA President Cecile 
Richards accusing House Republicans of assaulting women’s “primary and preventive health 
care, including lifesaving breast and cervical cancer screenings, annual exams, family 
planning visits, birth control, HIV testing, and more” (Planned Parenthood, 2011d). 
Simultaneously, they sent out an email asking supporters to “stand with Planned Parenthood” 
by contacting their congresspersons and making a donation to the Planned Parenthood Action 
Fund, the political advocacy arm of PPFA (A. Martin, personal communication, February 21, 
2013). They also asked partner organizations to send out emails on PPFA’s behalf to extend 
its audience to include other like-minded individuals. Google AdWords was utilized to place 
advertisements on search engines and websites to immediately drive supporters to sign 
petitions and donate money.  
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The next day, PPFA’s digital team posted a 450-word note to their Facebook wall 
from PPFA President Cecile Richards (Richards, 2011). Despite the fact that the digital team 
had previously resisted fundraising via social media, the note asked for emergency 
contributions to Planned Parenthood Action Fund. According to Stevens, the digital team felt 
that “[this] was the time to make exceptions, because . . . [there’s] a reason… [this] happened 
and we need your help.” The consensus among members of the digital team was that their 
decision to resist regularly fundraising via social media in favor of online community 
building had created a sense of trust between the organization and the community that 
allowed them to make these large, important, requests at a critical time.   
In addition to fundraising via social media, PPFA also capitalized on these events by 
increasing their email-based fundraising efforts (A. Martin, personal communication, 
February 21, 2013). The direct response team found that, despite the donor complacency that 
comes with having an allied democratic president in office, the threat to defund PPFA had 
galvanized supporters to donate money to the organization. Martin said, “If you think about 
the fact that the President was a Democrat but all of a sudden you have these Republicans 
going crazy…from a fundraising perspective that totally just changes the game.”  
Historically, PPFA has positioned itself as a health provider first and an abortion 
provider second when lobbying (Rohlinger, 2002). However PPFA’s research showed that its 
most-vocal supporters, who both volunteer and contribute financially, still saw PPFA 
primarily as an abortion provider (A. Martin, personal communication, February 21, 2013). 
As such, its communications goals during the battle over Title X funds required not only 
activating these base supporters to distribute messages, but also crafting messages that 
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simultaneously re-educated the base about the breadth of PPFA’s services. Martin explained 
these goals: 
It really was a re-education of our base—of how to talk about how vital we 
were while also reassuring them that we’re still going to stand up for abortion 
and provide those services. It’s a really delicate balance.  
 
As they had done while supporting the ACA, PPFA’s digital media team supported 
this effort by producing and disseminating infographics that, like the team’s social media 
posts, broke down complex issues into simple, palatable messages for PPFA's online 
audience  (see Figure 4). In addition to and in coordination with Facebook and Twitter, PPFA 
also used YouTube as a medium for directly sending out its messages. On February 14, four 
days prior to the House vote to eliminate Title X funds, Planned Parenthood’s YouTube 
channel had featured a video entitled “Stand With Planned Parenthood.” The short, simple 
video featured PPFA President Cecile Richards explaining the organization’s position on the 
upcoming House vote over Title X funds (Planned Parenthood, 2011e).  
This verbiage, to stand with Planned Parenthood, was a conscious attempt to control 
the message early on by steering the focus away from the Live Action videos and toward “a 
really strong positive message about standing with Planned Parenthood, not defending 
Planned Parenthood” (Bryant et al., 2012). “Standing with Planned Parenthood,” was to be 
the common theme of the campaign, which included events, television appearances, web-
based materials, op-eds, blog posts, and social media marketing. This theme was reiterated 
one day later when PPFA sent out a press release entitled, “Leading Members of Congress 
Stand with Planned Parenthood” (Planned Parenthood, 2011f). Digital team members created 
some of their own video content, such as the video depicted in Figure 3, a “how-to” video 
showing supporters how to use PPFA’s automated, web-based system to connect users with 
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their Congresspersons via phone, and show support for PPFA and continued federal funding 
of family planning services. PPFA also posted videos of celebrities, such as Scarlett 
Johansson and Gwyneth Paltrow stating their support for the organization. (cf. “Stars” in 
Luker, 1984). 
 
Figure 3. Planned Parenthood Title X Infographic 
The sense of urgency inherent in responding to political threats also revealed tactical 
differences between PPFA’s traditional media and digital media teams. Immediately after the 
release of Live Action’s controversial video, PPFA’s digital team began to receive messages 
on its Facebook page asking for an explanation of the incriminating content. The vice 
president of communication at PPFA told members of the digital team that the organization’s 
official response was in the process of being crafted and to delay any response until it 
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Figure 4. How-to call your Congressperson video 
was completed (Bryant et al., 2012). Stevens recalled the team’s opposition to this plan: 
Things are happening so quickly online and it’s not only my job to get the message 
out but to advocate for that type of [instantaneous] communication . . . . Our 
community was dictating it, because we had been there for them up until and then 
when something really hits the fan for us to just go radio silence would just be 
devastating.  
 
In the end, PPFA balanced the digital team’s need to respond immediately with the 
communication department’s need to properly craft the message. Staff members posted the 
following message:  
Planned Parenthood insists on the highest standards of care, and safeguards the 
trusted relationship we have with patients, families and communities. What appears 
on edited tapes made public today is not consistent with Planned Parenthood’s 
practices, and is under review (Planned Parenthood, 2011g). 
 
PPFA felt that this message showed the organization was aware of the video and would post 
an update as soon as staff members had more information, thus maintaining their position as 
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an active and responsive member of the community while also communicating the most 
effective message it could at the time.  
As the crisis progressed, PPFA’s upper management began to see more benefits of 
engaging more directly with constituents on social media (M. Stevens, personal 
communication, March 14, 2013). For example, they realized that they could test the efficacy 
of potential outreach strategies on the organization’s Facebook page before committing to 
larger, traditional media campaigns. In mid-March, PPFA’s upper management became 
interested in integrating social media more closely within the organization. The most 
significant change that happened at this time was that Cecile Richards began to post 
messages on her Twitter account. This served not only to add authenticity and voice to her 
Twitter account, but also legitimized social media as a practice within the entire Planned 
Parenthood organization.  
 Simultaneously, the digital team was pushing out testimonials by PPFA employees 
about positive experiences working side-by-side with Planned Parenthood’s supporters and 
photos of like-minded supporters holding “I Stand with Planned Parenthood” signs in front of 
Representative Pence’s office in Muncie, Indiana (Planned Parenthood, 2011h). Two days 
later, PPFA posted another video on YouTube showcasing those senators that were “standing 
with Planned Parenthood” (Planned Parenthood, 2011i).  
As the controversy continued, PPFA’s digital team members grew concerned that 
their online supporters were tiring of the PPFA message (Bryant et al., 2012). The digital 
team addressed this potential fatigue directly in a message to their supporters. Using a 
portable video camera, they filmed a video in PPFA’s offices in which they parodied 
themselves for their online supporters. The video featured staff members pretending to be 
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members of the public who were being bombarded with updates urging them to call their 
senators on behalf of PPFA. One female staff member was urging her less-committed friend 
to call her senator and even showed her how easy it was. It contained melodramatic lines like 
“If Planned Parenthood tells me one more time to call my Senator …” and “Don’t you know 
how important it is?” Despite posting this video over a month into the campaign, it was 
picked up by the online magazine Salon with the headline, “Meet the Stars of the Planned 
Parenthood Movement” (Williams, 2012). These attempts to build direct connections 
between supporters and the faces and voices of PPFA were visible beyond the digital media 
strategists, eventually reaching the top of the organization (M. Stevens, personal 
communication, March 14, 2013). 
The digital team also utilized social media to notify online users about PPFA’s 
traditional media actions, including upcoming interviews with Cecile Richards (M. Stevens, 
personal communication, March 14, 2013). Each day they released varied content, including 
celebrity endorsements, requests for donations to the action fund, photos of rallies, or open 
letters to congresspersons. PPFA also was able to leverage their robust social media traffic to 
increase their potential for visibility in television media. For example, a repost on PPFA’s 
Facebook of a 10-minute interview with Cecile Richards on MSNBC’s The Rachel Maddow 
Show provided direct and indirect benefits to PPFA. First, their thousands of followers could 
see the message and many would repost it to their friends, who might not follow PPFA 
directly on Facebook, extending the reach to those outside PPFA’s immediate network. It 
also provided an “in case you missed it,” element, extending the life of the individual 
message beyond its original airtime. Second, via linking, PPFA would drive users to 
MSNBC’s Maddow Facebook page, increasing traffic and participation for the network’s 
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social properties. This allowed PPFA to show, in a measurable way, Richards’ value in terms 
of increased web traffic for the networks, which they could use to lobby for airtime on other 
programs and network.   
In addition to reaching out to supporters, the digital team also worked with supporters 
and volunteers who were creating their own content. Using Facebook, PPFA setup a public 
photo album to showcase supporter-created media (Bryant et al., 2012). These included 
photos of supporters at rallies as well as protest art, usually created from photos found online 
and supplemented with additional text. The digital media team also reposted content, such as 
testimonials about positive experiences at PPFA clinics, created by online users in support of 
PPFA (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). The digital media team also 
participated in the creation of similar items. One day, two members of PPFA’s digital team 
walked around the office and found a variety of pop-culture items, such as Star Wars® 
figurines, and took photos of them holding small pieces of paper that said “I Stand With 
Planned Parenthood” (see Figure 5). They then created an online photo album for users to 
submit similar pop-culture items. Occasionally, users who opposed PPFA uploaded negative 
user-generated content, but these instances were few and far between and PPFA’s online 
community of supporters immediately responded to such behavior. For the most part, PPFA 
staff members did not delete negative content from their social media pages. For them, 
allowing an online community to mediate negative posts created a more genuine and 
trustworthy environment than one in which unfavorable messages were deleted or responded 
to by the organization itself. 
Finally, PPFA staff worked to craft messages specifically for the black and Latino 
communities they had been building relationships with prior to the Title X conflict. They 
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Figure 5. PPFA-created content to encourage user-generated content 
wanted to emphasize that those communities would be disproportionately affected by 
PPFA’s loss of Title X funds (A. Martin, personal communication, February 21, 2013). In a 
blog post on Being Latino, entitled “Taking away women’s health – check!,” PPFA staff 
outlined the controversy over PPFA’s Title X funds while also connecting the issue to the 
community by highlighting Latinos’ increased mortality rate for cervical cancer and their 
higher risk for unplanned pregnancy due to lower rates of contraceptive use (Lazzaro, 
2011b). According to a PPFA staff member working in online Latino outreach, PPFA also 
benefited from user-generated content within the Latino community. One female Latino user 
wrote a blog post entitled “I’m a dreamer (undocumented immigrant), a woman, and I need 
Planned Parenthood” (DreamActivist, 2011). Posts like this gave PPFA staff the opportunity 
to step in and talk to the Latino community about the specific implications of removing Title 
X funds.  
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As the debate over Title X funding moved into its third week and PPFA staff 
members still had no idea when the Senate vote would be, they became concerned that the 
tactics and messages they had been using to encourage participation were not effective 
enough to continue to keep supporters invigorated for even more time (Bryant et al., 2012). 
In daily meetings, staff members discussed new ideas for mobilizing supporters. On March 3, 
Live Action, the anti-abortion group that had previously released the undercover videos of 
PPFA employees, announced that on March 7 their staff would begin a four-day bus tour 
called “Women Speak Out: Defund Planned Parenthood” (Brown, 2011). The tour was to 
travel through 13 congressional districts, feature local pro-life speakers and thank 
congressional representatives for their votes to defund PPFA. Stevens recalled a strategy 
meeting in which employees were discussing how to respond to Live Action. “They’ve got a 
bus and they’re spreading all these lies – and we need…we should get a bus and tell the 
truth,” a senior staff member said. 
 On March 7, both as a response to Live Action, and as a means of keeping their 
issues front and center, PPFA sent their own bus on the “Planned Parenthood Truth Tour” 
(Planned Parenthood, 2011j). As explained in the introduction of this thesis, PPFA’s bus 
tour, which followed the Live Action tour to all of its pre-determined locations, was 
integrated with PPFA’s social media properties. PPFA affiliates in the regions where the bus 
traveled were active in promoting, via social media and email lists, the bus events, many of 
which were held on college campuses (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 
2013). Staff members from the digital team traveled on the bus, documenting the events and 
posting them on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The tour also had an online microsite, a 
site that exists independently of the organization’s main website (Baldwin-Philippi, 2013), 
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that featured a companion blog (istandwithplannedparenthood.blogspot.com), which served 
as an online diary of the bus’ past events and a calendar of upcoming events while also 
showcasing statistics about PPFA’s services, donation opportunities, and videos and photos 
of supporters interacting with PPFA staff who were travelling on the bus. 
PPFA had planned to send its bus only to those locations where Live Action had 
setup its own events (M. Stevens, personal communication, March 14, 2013). As the tour 
progressed, however, PPFA found the bus to be effective beyond these original purposes. 
“People really liked the idea. They thought the bus was cool. People always wanted to come 
onto the bus,” said Stevens. “It turned into a way to proactively meet with people who were 
using our services or benefitting from our services or definitely had a stake in the game.” 
Specifically, PPFA staff members found the bus tour was allowing them to connect with 
young, politically active people who were representative of the new direction that the 
organization was trying to head. The tour also allowed staff members to gather signatures for 
petitions, hand out t-shirts, and take photos of individuals for the ongoing “I Stand with 
Planned Parenthood” campaign on social media.  
In late March and early April, conflict over Title X funding continued to be a major 
part of political conflict in Washington, D.C. As Democrats and Republicans both dug in 
their heels over funding for PPFA, it seemed plausible that the government would shut down, 
as the issue was attached to a continuing resolution that was necessary to fund ongoing 
government services. On April 7, Cecile Richards sent out a press release chiding the 
remaining U.S. Senators who appeared to be willing to stop supporting the government over 
PPFA’s Title X funding. The same day, the “truth tour” culminated in Washington, D.C. for 
a huge rally on the Capital steps that was broadcast on Youtube and highlighted on Facebook 
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and Twitter. On April 9, the Senate voted (58-42) not to cut Title X funding and defund 
PPFA (Steinhauer, 2011). 
 
Organizational Learning 
 
During PPFA’s conflict over Title X funds in 2011, its staff members had the 
opportunity to test, hone, and evaluate, in a situation of real political urgency, the digital 
media tactics they had been developing prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) in 2010. In terms of fundraising, they had found success, defined in this case by 
record numbers of donations, using email and social media to solicit donations from online 
communities during a time of financial crisis. The length of the conflict had also shown them 
the benefits of and tactics for garnering media coverage over an extended period of time. 
They also learned that relationships they built with online communities in times of political 
calm could be leveraged during times of increased political conflict. This section explains 
how PPFA staff members used these skills to navigate a conflict with an allied organization.  
After PPFA’s success in the Title X conflict, PPFA began putting into place new 
digital properties to continue to position themselves as thought leaders on issues related to 
women’s health. In November, PPFA launched a blog, womenarewatching.org, in which 
users compiled and discussed state and federal politicians, corporations, and other groups 
identified as hostile to its stance on reproductive rights. In December, these teams’ staff 
started a second Facebook page focused solely on PPFA as a health information and service 
provider, leaving the original page, and its more than 200,000 followers, to focus solely on 
advocacy issues, which had already been the main function of the page (M. Stevens, personal 
communication, March 14, 2013). Prior to this, PPFA had left much of the Facebook-based 
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dissemination of non-political health messages to local affiliates, each of which had their 
own Facebook page. After the events surrounding Title X, PPFA’s national office established 
new “Planned Parenthood Health” social media pages to highlight specific health messages 
promoted by the national organization. The older national accounts, each of which had 
millions of followers, were re-named to specifically focus on Planned Parenthood Action 
Fund, the advocacy arm of PPFA. Having convinced PPFA’s upper management of the value 
of social media, the digital team hired several more staff and formed two teams, one for each 
social media program. Going forward, health-focused social media was to be run out of the 
New York office while the media focused on political advocacy would be run out of 
Washington, D.C.   
On January 31, 2012, eight months after the potential government shutdown over 
PPFA’s Title X funding, Susan G. Komen for the Cure, the largest non-profit funder of breast 
exams in the United States, announced that its updated grant-making policies would exclude 
PPFA from receiving annual grants that PPFA and its affiliates had been receiving for years 
(Harris & Belluck, 2012). As with the Title X controversy, this conflict was not a surprise to 
PPFA communication staff members, who already had heard this news via phone days before 
and were ready with a public response (A. Martin, personal communication, February 21, 
2013). In fact, PPFA’s upper management had known for months that Komen’s board of 
directors was considering the policy change.  
A digital media manager at PPFA recalled how the team applied similar tactics to 
those used in the previous conflict saying, “when the story came out we were ready in the 
same way, but in a totally different context” (Bryant et al., 2012). She stressed that the Title 
X controversy had demonstrated the importance of “getting control of the message.” In order 
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to control the release of the news, PPFA identified and provided in advance to a news 
reporter specific research about the impact of Komen’s decision. As soon as the news broke, 
PPFA’s staff sent out a formal press release from PPFA President Cecile Richards, an email 
to its supporters entitled “Disappointing news from a friend,” and posted a copy of the 
message on its social media site (Gray, 2012). It read:  
We are alarmed and saddened that the Susan G. Komen for the Cure Foundation 
appears to have succumbed to political pressure. Our greatest desire is for Komen to 
reconsider this policy and recommit to the partnership on which so many women 
count.  
 
By sending out this message, PPFA was telling the public that Komen, an organization built 
around support women’s health, was sacrificing its cause for a political issue. 
The day after the Komen story broke, an article by Richards appeared on 
Huffingtonpost.com (Richards, 2012). In it, she listed the large numbers of breast exams and 
mammogram referrals that Komen funds allowed PPFA to provide over the prior five years. 
She told supporters looking to support PPFA that they could sign an open letter criticizing 
the Komen foundation, contribute to the PPFA Emergency Fund, and make an appointment 
at a PPFA clinic to have a breast exam. This combination of activism, fundraising, and 
concern was followed by a testimonial, collected via social media during the Title X conflict, 
by a grateful patient who had had a lump in her breast biopsied by PPFA doctors and paid for 
by Komen funds (Bryant et al., 2012). Komen did not respond to emails or phone calls (CNN 
Political Unit, 2012) but denied on its Facebook page that its actions were politically 
motivated, saying, “we are dismayed and extremely disappointed that actions we have taken 
to strengthen our granting process have been widely mischaracterized” (Susan G. Komen for 
the Cure, 2012).  
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PPFA staff members were concerned about the public relations implications of being 
attacked by Komen, one of the largest women’s health organizations in the United States (A. 
Martin, personal communication, February 21, 2013).  Yet PPFA staff also saw these events 
as opportunities to again educate the base about PPFA’s services and, more importantly, to 
expand its supporter list and to fundraise from the still-invigorated supporter community. As 
they had done in response to the Title X conflict, PPFA staff immediately activated their 
fundraising networks via email and social media. They called on supporters to donate to a 
Breast Health Emergency Fund, aimed at “offset[ing] the support that 19 local Planned 
Parenthood programs [stood] to lose from Komen” (A. Martin, personal communication, 
February 21, 2013). As it became clear that PPFA was winning a large share of public 
opinion during this conflict, its staff made more aggressive communication choices. After 
one day, PPFA had recouped, via donations, the entire dollar amount that Komen had 
withheld. In the 24 hours after the Komen funding news broke Tuesday, 6,000 online donors 
contributed a total of $400,000 (Kliff & Sun, 2012). On an average day, the group receives 
100 to 200 donations. 
Though the previous sections touched on PPFA’s development of relationships with 
large, general online communities and those specifically inhabited by Latinos and African 
Americans, they had also worked to develop relationships with the Komen Foundation (see 
Figure 6) (A. Martin, personal communication, February 21, 2013). This required PPFA to 
walk a more difficult line. With Title X, Republicans in Congress were clearly the opposition 
as were those who supported their policy to eliminate Title X funding. With Komen, a non-
profit organization that shared the goal of improving women’s health, PPFA risked alienating 
many of its own supporters who were also volunteers and employees of Komen’s affiliates, 
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many of whom had strong relationships with PPFA’s affiliates in their local areas. Many of 
the Komen affiliates disagreed strongly with their national organization’s actions toward 
PPFA (Condon, 2012). As such, according to Martin, PPFA had to: 
tread a very fine line of saying that Komen does really great work and it’s too bad 
that their leadership has made this decision because locally they’re doing such great 
work. We had to manage their internal politics as well as our own because we didn’t 
want to in any way defame the local affiliates, who, if they had their choice would not 
have cut off funding.  
 
 
Figure 6. Facebook post of PPFA staff members at Komen race 
While Komen remained quiet, PPFA began posting on Facebook links to a supporter-
written letter entitled, “I Still Stand with Planned Parenthood” (Planned Parenthood Action, 
2012). The letter closed with the following lines: 
Know this: When you go after Planned Parenthood and the people they serve, you go 
after ME. I stand with Planned Parenthood. I stand with them against anyone who 
wants to stop women from receiving the health care they need. I stand with them 
today, tomorrow, and for as long as I need to. 
 
The letter received 23,000 shares and reached a 27% viral percentage1. PPFA staff members 
also continued to post positive testimonials they had collected during the Title X conflict.  
                                                
1 On Facebook, “Virality” is a measure of the number of people who have shared a story 
from a Facebook post as a percentage of the number of people who have seen it. The average 
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Unlike the Congressional conflict, in which PPFA needed to regularly educate and 
actively mobilize its supporters, the Komen situation showed that PPFA’s online community 
remained invigorated and had been “primed during the two-month (Title X) campaign” 
(Bryant et al., 2012). PPFA supporters flooded Komen’s Facebook page with negative 
comments. Many people wrote posts on Komen’s Facebook page saying that they were 
donating to PPFA money they had originally planned to donate to Komen and encouraged 
others to do the same. Other users used protest techniques such as “culture jamming” (L. 
Lievrouw, 2011), using Komen’s popular “passionately pink” line of retail items to mock the 
organization (see Figure 7). Hackers even clandestinely made changes to Komen’s home 
page, adding a text box that said, “Help us run over poor women on our way to the bank” 
(Wire, 2012). Planned Parenthood allies, including Credo Mobile, began running paid 
advertisements on Facebook urging users to “Tell Komen Not to Throw Planned Parenthood 
Under the Bus” (Lopatto & Armstrong, 2012). 
Third-party websites with angry rhetoric about Komen began to emerge in online 
spaces and were shared on social media. Initially, these made PPFA’s traditional 
communication team uncomfortable (A. Martin, personal communication, February 21, 
2013). It was necessary for digital team members to educate traditional communication staff 
about these online environments. Martin recalled: 
If you’re on the traditional communication side, you’re all about controlling the 
message . . . so it can feel a little disarming to have someone start a random Facebook 
page in the name of Planned Parenthood . . . . I think digital really played a role in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Facebook viral percentage is 1.92%. For an explanation of Facebook virality measures, visit 
https://www.facebook.com/help/279981958639502 
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Figure 7. User-generated content protesting Komen 
helping traditional communication really understand how to navigate—and control 
the message a little bit.” 
 
Another third-party site emerged on the micro-blogging site Tumblr entitled “Planned 
Parenthood Saved Me,” in which users were asked to submit stories about how their “lives 
were saved or changed because they had access to affordable healthcare like cancer screening 
through Planned Parenthood” (Bryant et al., 2012). Some of these sites were able to discuss 
the Komen issue with a level of candor that, had it originated with PPFA, would have been 
startling. Heather Holdridge, PPFA’s director of digital strategy pointed out that it would 
have been taboo for PPFA to directly ask the online community for those extremely personal 
testimonials, yet the organization still benefited from and participated in the dissemination of 
those messages when they were initiated by third parties (Bryant et al., 2012). With this in 
mind, PPFA utilized social media to amplify many of the messages that emerged in the 
independent, online community. On February 3, 2012, after three days of controversy, 
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Komen modified its grant-making rules to remove those restrictions that excluded PPFA as a 
recipient (Morgan & Yukhananov, 2012).  
Despite being in conflict with a popular supporter of women’s health, PPFA benefited 
in many ways from its role in the Komen controversy. According to PPFA, its email list 
increased by 1.2 million people last year, half of whom were under 35 (Kliff, 2012), an age 
demographic PPFA had struggled to reach in the past. Even after the conflict, PPFA 
continued its work to engage and support its online community. PPFA acknowledged its 
online community members by giving the creators of “Planned Parenthood Saved Me” a 
“Maggie Award” for media excellence, named after PPFA founder Margaret Sanger (Planned 
Parenthood, n.d.-b). PPFA had been giving these awards annually to journalists and 
documentary filmmakers since 1978, but this was the first time they had included a category 
specifically for social media.  
 
 Discussion 
 
 
 Research into how organizations in the political sphere adapt to new media 
environments has received much attention in recent years (e.g. Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; 
Bimber et al., 2012; Bimber, 2003; Carty, 2011; Karpf, 2012; Kreiss, 2012a; L. Lievrouw, 
2011). However, within this scholarship there are few studies that focus on long-standing, 
formal social movement organizations and how they adapt to such environments, particularly 
in response to political threats. This is important, as studies have shown that the practice of 
media production is becoming increasingly intertwined with the actions of a variety actors, 
including activists and politicians, in online spaces (Anderson, 2010; Chadwick, 2011a). This 
research also shows how responding to such threats can affect an organization’s capacity to 
actively engage in future conflicts. 
 While some studies have looked at the use of new media by long-standing, member-
driven, civic organizations (e.g. Bimber et al., 2012), this study offers one of the first detailed 
looks at the internal processes of an established, contentious organization taking steps to 
adopt and implement new media technologies. Though this case study offers only empirical 
insight into the strategic use of new media by one organization, Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America, similar findings in studies of other political organizations, such as 
campaigns (Kreiss, 2012a) and civic organizations (Bimber et al., 2012), imply that such 
practices may eventually become widespread.  
 This thesis shows, over a two-year time period, how PPFA prepped for and responded 
to a major political threat, turning that threat into a successful political opportunity, and how 
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PPFA utilized skills gained during that time in a future conflict. This research shows that 
PPFA built, over a series of campaigns, relationships with external online communities (i.e. 
African-Americans and Latinos) while also building an extremely active support community 
around its own online properties (i.e. Facebook). One of the most substantive findings in the 
study concerns the promotion by movement organization staff of user-generated content by 
movement supporters. While studies have discussed “culture jamming,” (Dery, 1993; Leah 
Lievrouw, 2011), which include the appropriation and modification of popular culture 
images for the purpose of making a political point, these studies have not regularly found 
evidence of supporter engagement being modeled and encouraged in a systematic way.  
In the context of scholarship on abortion politics, this thesis provides a much-needed 
update of the practices of a member of the pro-choice movement. Scholars have produced 
rich, detailed histories of the U.S. abortion rights movement starting at its inception (e.g. 
Luker, 1984; Staggenborg, 1991). Other scholars have looked specifically at how and when 
organizations in the pro-choice movement use particular frames (e.g. Burns, 2005; Rohlinger, 
2002). However, focusing on a movement’s choice of media frames assumes that that 
movement already has media access through which to apply its choice of frames. Among 
other things, this thesis provides insight into how an influential organization in the pro-choice 
movement uses new media to increase its level of traditional media access. For example, via 
links on its social media pages, PPFA drove users to the Facebook page of a major cable 
network—MSNBC—increasing traffic on the network’s site in a measurable way. PPFA was 
later able to leverage its network-verified audience size to garner additional media 
appearances.  
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Lastly, PPFA’s reported success using social media after Cecile Richards began using 
Twitter during the Title X conflict also highlights the importance of organizational support 
for media strategies, particularly those involving new technologies. This thesis supports 
Bimber et al.’s (2012) conclusion that traditional organizations for collective action remain 
relevant even in an environment that includes multi-issue organizations MoveOn (cf. Karpf, 
2012). PPFA’s decisions to complement its traditional media tactics with related promotion 
and dialogue on social media offer a potential roadmap for movement organizations looking 
to leverage social media use to achieve their political goals.  
For practitioners working with SMOs and for scholars, the case of PPFA is important 
because it provides nuance to the more broad claims made by scholars about the use of 
technology by movement organizations. It is not sufficient to look at those using new media 
and those that are not and identify the related successes and failures. It is also important to 
show, as this thesis does, how an organization becomes successful with regards to new 
media. Organizational structure that allows for the interaction between diverse teams, as well 
as the buy-in of upper management, are necessary to achieve success when implementing 
new media technologies in a large organization. That being said, the case of PPFA showed 
that the catalyst for implementation can sometimes precede the buy-in of upper management. 
In PPFA’s case, the availability of resources, in the form of interns, allowed staff members to 
demonstrate the potential impact of using new media as part of a larger communication 
strategy, bolstering the long-term success of the new media division.  
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 
 This thesis attempts to provide an insider’s understanding into how long-standing 
social movement organizations adapt to an increasingly complex media environment. The in-
depth interviews with staff members working for PPFA in both traditional and digital media 
revealed not only the specific strategies and tactics utilized by the organization in combatting 
political threats and protecting its public image, but also the philosophies, motivations, and 
decisions that led staff to make particular decisions both inside the organization and in the 
media arena. This study reveals that staff members working in digital media prior to the Title 
X conflict focused their social media practices on community building rather than on 
practical short-term goals like fundraising or information dissemination. The case study also 
reveals how PPFA’s ability to utilize new media to respond to a major political threat was 
related to the staff’s commitment to developing and honing these tactics in advance of such 
threats.     
 This thesis, in particular the research of PPFA’s actions during the Komen conflict, 
illustrates clearly the role that online communities can play not only in supporting an 
organization’s message, but also in crafting and disseminating those messages that would not 
be palatable to an audience coming directly from the organization. This thesis also illustrates 
the power that the threat of financial loss can be in crafting frames around fundraising efforts 
and building lists of supporters. PPFA’s strategies also bring up questions about what 
mobilization means for movement organizations using social media. In addition to traditional 
mobilization such as protesting, fundraising, or contacting of policymakers, PPFA also 
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mobilized its users to advocate on its behalf in online spaces through the sharing and creation 
of user-generated content.  
 Lastly, this thesis demonstrates the potential value that political threats can have for 
long-standing organizations, particularly those with large online communities and significant 
capacity for online fundraising. Indeed, long-standing organizations, particularly those that 
are predisposed to contentious issues, have the potential to move toward an event- or issue-
based form of fundraising rather than one based on traditional membership.  
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
 
These are major questions and follow-ups. Additional probes may develop as interviews are 
conducted, per the norms of qualitative interview research. 
 
Organizational Role and Background 
• What drew you to work for this organization? 
• How did working for this organization compare with other professional roles that you 
have held? 
o What specific challenges did you face that you did not anticipate? 
• Has your role with the organization changed since you first started? 
o Did this change over the course of your tenure there? 
• Who is responsible for supervising your work? 
o Has this changed over the course of your tenure there? 
 
Non-Crisis Roles and Responsibilities  
• Can you walk me through what you would call a typical day of work? 
• Are activists and bloggers and important audience for your work? 
o Describe your interaction with activists and bloggers. 
• Are politicians an important audience for your work? 
o Describe your interaction with politicians. 
• Is the general public an important audience for your work? 
o Describe your interaction with members of the general public. 
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• Do staff talk about media audiences? 
o If so, how would you characterize these discussions? 
o Was there anything that informed these discussions (for example, books, 
political arguments, previous political campaigns, etc.)?  
• Is the professional press an important audience for your work? 
o Describe your interaction with professional journalists. 
o What outlets? 
• What role does social media play in your interaction with outside groups?  
o Has this changed over the course of your tenure there?  
o Which social media technologies do you most utilize?  
 
Congressional Crisis Roles and Responsibilities 
• What specific responsibilities did you have when Congressional leaders threatened to 
defund your organization in early 2011? 
• Who was responsible for supervising your work? 
o Is this a different person than during non-crisis time?  
• How did this period differ from the typical days we’ve already discussed?  
• How did the organization respond publicly to these threats?  
• To what degree was your organization’s response pre-planned?  
o Were there aspects of these plans that were more effective than others?  
o When, if at all, was it necessary to deviate from these plans?   
• What would you say was the biggest challenge you faced on your job? 
o What would have made your work easier? 
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• Whom did you work closest with? 
• Can you walk me through what you would call a typical day during this crisis? 
o Can you walk me through a period that marked a high point for you? 
o Can you walk me through a period that marked a low point for you? 
• What role did social media play in your crisis management strategy?  
• Who were the key decision makers on staff as relates to your specific job 
responsibilities? 
o Could you approach them with any concerns/problems you had with regard to 
your job? 
o Did they take your input seriously? 
o Can you relate a specific example of a time when you approached your 
superiors about your work? 
• What professional or personal experiences do you believe best prepared you for your 
work during this crisis? 
 
Inter-Organizational Crisis Roles and Responsibilities 
• What specific responsibilities did you have when an allied non-profit organization 
threatened to defund your organization in early 2012? 
• Who was responsible for supervising your work? 
o Is this a different person than during the previous crisis?  
• How did this period differ from the typical days we’ve already discussed?  
• How did the organization respond publicly to these threats?  
• To what degree was your organization’s response pre-planned?  
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o Were there aspects of these plans that were more effective than others?  
o When, if at all, was it necessary to deviate from these plans?   
• What would you say was the biggest challenge you faced on your job? 
o What would have made your work easier? 
• Whom did you work closest with? 
• Can you walk me through what you would call a typical day during this crisis? 
o Can you walk me through a period that marked a high point for you? 
o Can you walk me through a period that marked a low point for you? 
 
• Who were the key decision makers on staff as relates to your specific job 
responsibilities? 
o Could you approach them with any concerns/problems you had with regard to 
your job? 
o Did they take your input seriously? 
o Can you relate a specific example of a time when you approached your 
superiors about your work? 
• What professional or personal experiences do you believe best prepared you for your 
work during this crisis? 
• In terms of communication strategy, how did this crisis differ from the Congressional 
crisis?  
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Reflections on the Crises 
• To what degree do you feel your strategies were your various audiences? 
o With the press?  
o With politicians?  
o With allied interest groups?  
• To what degree do you feel social media influenced the outcome of these crises? 
• Do you utilize any measurement tactics or analytical tools to gauge the success of 
your strategies?  
o If so, do you break these down by hour? By day?  
o Are you able to gauge the impact of the tactics on specific target groups?  
• Does the organization’s experience with previous crises inform its planning and 
decision-making for new crises that might emerge?  
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